Unheeded Lessons: What Did We Fail to Learn From the Financial Crisis?http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2011/07/24/unheeded-lessons-what-did-we-fail-to-learn-from-th.aspx Knowledge@Wharton
July 24, 2011
Nearly two years after the financial meltdown of September 2008, is the global economy any less risky? Or do the conditions that led to the crisis still persist? These questions and more were at the heart of a conference titled "Global Risk: New Perspectives and Opportunities," organized at Wharton by Penn Lauder CIBER (the Center for International Business Education and Research) and Santander Universities. The consensus: We managed to respond to the immediate threats, but the longer-term drivers of instability are still active.
There is a growing consensus among experts that the underlying conditions that produced the crisis have not been neutralized. We managed to respond to the immediate threats of the financial meltdown and to avoid the most devastating scenarios, but the longer-term drivers of global instability remain active.
Government interventions, noted Stijn Claessens, assistant director of research at the International Monetary Fund, were largely what had been seen before in past crises -- "liquidity support, bank recapitalizations -- with the same mistakes as before. As we take stock today, we have to admit we didn't go as far as we wanted to with regard to reform and restructuring."
"The initial vector of contagion," stated Richard Herring, a professor of finance at the Wharton School, "was that after Paribas refused to pay out, the banks lost confidence in each other. Trade finance depends heavily on that trust. We wasted a whole year trying to interpret that as a liquidity crisis, and it was evident to the banks themselves that it was a solvency crisis. All the central banks were just pouring liquidity into the markets instead of dealing with the solvency issue."
"Entire countries can have destructive discount rates," said Jack Goldstone, a professor of public finance at George Mason University, "if they become focused on short-term rather than long-term futures. One reason the East Asian Tigers had done well developmentally is that they were lucky to have leaders who put a higher value on their countries as a whole moving up in the global league tables than on their personal power and position. How we do this for a whole country may be a matter of leadership or may be a matter of events changing the discount rate. We keep making the same mistakes because we don't seem to have a lever saying, 'Here's something that may happen in 30 years.' We have a 'What has posterity ever done for me?' attitude."
"It would be interesting to see whether there's a categorical difference between democracies and non-democracies," suggested Bruce Carruthers, a professor of sociology at Northwestern University, "particularly within the democracies as populations age -- older people make more claims on resources but also have more political weight, which means that political solutions to this problem will get tougher in democracies -- maybe not so much in different political systems."
Claessens noted that there still don't exist "robust enough institutions that can limit bubbles as they start to get more risky. We don't have well enough developed regulatory governance, controls on revolving doors, accountability, and adequate supervision."
Harold James, a professor of history at Princeton, agreed that the causes still existed: "While the housing market isn't as big of a problem, poor people are still taking on too much debt. This time it's through other kinds of debt, like credit cards -- compensating for decreased incomes."
Instead of giving credit rating agencies more bite, James said that "getting rid of ratings agencies would be an important step forward." Because they are essentially in bed with issuers, "this is why they get into the position of being so uniquely important to market outcomes," he noted.
"People are trying to wrestle with the question of wrong incentives in banks and institutions that are too large, but it can't be done quickly. It may well be that the geography of the next financial crisis is slightly different, which wouldn't be surprising. They don't exactly strike in the same place," James added.
"As far as global imbalances, we got a slight contraction of the imbalance in the Great Recession but not a complete unwinding," James noted. "That's good, because if you keep unwinding it, you get a reversal of the global flows -- that's indeed the kind of thing that pushes a Great Depression rather than a recession. They're increasing again, though, and we're also in an era in which cheap money is fueling new commodity booms and asset booms. So the problem is that we're still living in a world that produces these crises."
Business as usual on Wall Street
The U.S., said Roubini, risks having an anemic recovery. "If and when the public sector deleverages, raising taxes, reducing transfer payments, cutting spending -- it will force another round of deleveraging of the household sector. Also, the labor market is improving, but unemployment is still very high."
Most conference participants agreed that the incipient recovery could be threatened by a return to "business as usual" on Wall Street, with little change in executive compensation, perhaps a greater concentration of risk and a worsening of the "too-big-to-fail" problem, and the lingering issue of shadow banking practices.
Several factors in the United States in particular bear considering, Roubini added, including "deleveraging of the household sector, high unemployment, a housing double dip, state and local government problems, and gridlock in Congress." Pushing these issues off to the future could cause a bond market revolt. The high-growth developing countries are another source of risk. "Emerging market