We spend plenty of time blabbing about the big boys of banking -- you know, Morgan Stanley
Jefferies
In what looks like a fairly common rundown of revenue sources, trading segments stole the show:
Segment |
Q3 2009 Revenue |
Q3 2008 Revenue |
---|---|---|
Commissions |
$94 million |
$113 million |
Principal Transactions |
$372 million |
($3 million) |
Investment Banking |
$123 million |
$130 million |
Asset Management |
$21 million |
($3 million) |
Net Interest Income |
$84 million |
$31 million |
Digging a little deeper into Jefferies' trading-based revenue:
Segment |
Q3 2009 Revenue |
---|---|
Equities |
$149 million |
Fixed Income and Commodities |
$313 million |
High Yield |
$95 million |
Obviously, fixed income is where it's at. This is the same setup Goldman Sachs
So what sets Jefferies apart? Unlike some of its larger investment-banking rivals, its balance sheet leverage is fairly subdued:
Bank |
Common Equity Leverage Ratio, Q2 2009* |
---|---|
Goldman Sachs |
15.9 |
Morgan Stanley |
18.3 |
Jefferies |
12.3 |
*Most recent comparative data available
In short, it's sort of a scaled-down, under-the-radar, safer version of the big boys. Even better, Jefferies' risk-adjusted leverage ratio was just 8.4 in the most recent quarter. That isn't the kind of leverage you'd associate with a blatantly dangerous business model. It's what an investment bank used to look like. (Before the industry exploded.)
Most likely, that relative prudence stems from management knowing that it isn't too big to fail. That's what I like about Jefferies: It's essentially a mellowed-out, mini Goldman Sachs, stripped of bad publicity, conspiracy theories, Rolling Stone articles, and even regulatory burdens. Unlike Goldman and Morgan Stanley, Jefferies isn't a bank holding company (and never needed to be), so it won't fall under many of the same regulatory restrictions its competitors will.
The industry as whole still makes me squirm, but I'll admit: If you're going to run a bank, that's how you do it.
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